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The federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 and legislation
or rules in most states authorize courts to require participation in
mediation.' The primary split among jurisdictions, therefore, is not on
whether but how court-compelled mediation should occur.2 Meanwhile,
scholars have focused largely on the debate as to whether courts should
require participation in mediation.3 The resulting commentary has provided
* Robert Rack is the Chief Circuit Mediator for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit and Chair of the Supreme Court of Ohio Committee on Dispute
Resolution.
** Nancy H. Rogers is the Joseph S. Platt-Porter Wright Morris and Arthur
Professor of Law at the Ohio State University College of Law.
1 See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C.A. § 652 (West Supp.
1999); NANCY H. RoGERs & CRAG A. McEwEN, MED A ON: LAw, POLICY &
PRACrICE, app. B (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1998) (listing over 40 states in which
mandatory mediation is authorized for courts or agencies).
2 The dispute resolution of the five courts involved in this project could identify
several of the models listed in the text in some of their courts.
3 See, e.g., Thomas Eisele, Mandatory v. Non-Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR, in
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND OTMER PROCESsEs 268 (Stephen
B. Goldberg et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992); Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REv. 487 (1989); Lucy V.
Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed
Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1; Andreas Nelle, Making
Mediation Mandatory: A Proposed Framework, 7 Omo ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 287
(1992); Frank E.A. Sander et al., Judicial (Mis)use ofADR? A Debate, 27 U. TOL. L.
REv. 885 (1996); Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution:
What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REv. 2079 (1993);
Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Mandated Participation and Settlement
Coercion: Dispute Resolution As It Relates to the Courts, AEBTRATION J., Mar. 1991,
at 38.
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little guidance on the best structures for mandatory mediation. 4 This
symposium and an ongoing inquiry5 will help fill that gap.
The courts have structured their compulsory referrals in ways that
reflect differing answers to the following questions: Should the courts
require parties not only to participate but also to pay for the mediation or
should the courts handle fees for mediation as they do other required events
in the court process? Should courts refer cases only to court-employed
mediators or also to individuals or agencies with which they contract?
Should the courts rely on volunteer mediators?
The answers to these questions, together with the resources of the
court, determine the structure chosen by the court. The Dispute Resolution
Committee of the Supreme Court of Ohio, through its dispute resolution
coordinator, invited dispute resolution coordinators from the Colorado,
Georgia, Hawai'i, and Maine Supreme Courts, working with the Western
Justice Foundation, to jointly lead an inquiry regarding the effects of
picking a particular structure. Each state had court mediation program
structures based on different answers to the questions above. This five-state
inquiry led the coordinators to identify five common structures for court-
referred mediation:
1. The court refers the parties to court-employed mediators and
charges the parties either nothing or a nominal fee;
2. The court refers the parties to nonprofit mediation programs
under contract with the courts and charges the parties either
nothing or a nominal fee;
3. The court refers the parties to a pool of private mediators paid
by the court and charges the parties either nothing or a nominal
fee;
4. The court refers the parties to a pool of private mediators and
directs the parties to pay the mediators; or
5. The court refers the parties to volunteer mediators supervised by
the court and charges the parties either nothing or a nominal fee.
4 See Craig A. McEwen & Nancy H. Rogers, Planning Public Sector Mediation
Programs: The Role of Statutes and Rules, NIDR FORUM, Fall 1995, at 14; Society for
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, supra note 3 (recommending against compulsory
payment by the parties in mandatory mediation).
5 The Western Justice Foundation has pursued funding for an empirical study of
aspects of the alternative structures for mandatory mediation.
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Despite these variations among programs, only a few policy papers
have taken a stance on the structure of court-connected mediation
programs. One, adopted by the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution (SPIDR), came out against mandatory programs compelling
party payment to the mediator except in extraordinary cases (structure
number 4 above). The SPIDR Report emphasized the logic of the courts
providing all compulsory procedures for the initial filing fee, except in
those cases meriting appointment of special masters. In addition, the report
warned, "[u]ser fees imposed only on those referred to mandatory
processes pose particular problems. If not properly regulated, dispute
resolution user fees can result in undesirable coercion to settle for the
parties who cannot afford them and in unseemly practices through which
the court provides lucrative employment to private providers." 6 Another
report, a blue ribbon advisory group writing the Standards for Court-
Connected Mediation Programs, adopted the same view regarding the
requirement that parties pay private mediation providers. 7
Assessments of court-referred mediation structures might depend on the
vantage point of the assessor. One concerned about maximizing
professional opportunities for mediators as the prime value, for example,
might lean toward a model that directs the greatest payment to the largest
number of persons-the one in which the courts require the parties to pay
private providers at their usual hourly rate. A person concerned primarily
with fostering community mediation programs, in contrast, would lean
toward the model that directs a steady flow of cases and income to these
programs. But for lawmakers, the key goals are those of the justice system
and the individual parties. The five-state group asked two leading dispute
resolution experts, U.S. Magistrate Wayne Brazil and law professor John
P. McCrory, to take a particular vantage point and discuss the policy trade-
offs of the five common structures identified above. Judge Brazil wrote
from the standpoint of the justice system, while Professor McCrory focused
on the parties' viewpoints.
Judge Brazil, wearing the justice system glasses, identifies values that
weigh mostly, though not entirely, toward a model in which mediators
work directly for the court. He emphasizes the importance of the
mediators' integrity, not just their effectiveness in helping the parties reach
settlement. He also notes that courts should avoid conveying through their
6 Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution, supra note 3, at 42-43.
7 See Tim INSTITUTE OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION & CENTER FOR DISPUTE
SETTIEMENT, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS
§ 5.1 (1990).
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mediation structure a message that the courts use mediation to get rid of
cases. He suggests that direct supervision will best assure no "emotional,
informational, or intellectual manipulation" by the mediators in order to
achieve settlement. He points out the expense of efforts to regulate private
mediators to achieve these ends and questions their likely effectiveness. He
also argues the importance of providing mandatory mediation without an
additional fee in terms of what the courts wish to "signal" about their
support for efforts to achieve settlement. Noting that court-supported
mediation models may develop capacity slowly when court resources are
thin, Judge Brazil weighs in favor of quality over quantity, in terms of the
larger aims of the justice system.
Professor McCrory also supports quality over quantity, but from the
viewpoint of the parties' interests. He focuses on quality primarily in terms
of a fair process and efficient settlement by the parties. He acknowledges
the merits of providing mandatory mediation without charging the parties,
but suggests a different course when the choice is party-paid mediation
versus no or low quality mediation. When courts do not have the resources
to provide a fair mediation process that will lead to efficient settlement, he
would prefer to ask the parties to pay rather than lose the availability or
quality of mediation, as long as the payment does not interfere with the
cost-effectiveness of mediation.
Both writers express frustration about the inadequacy of empirical
evidence on matters of importance to their analysis-whether staff
mediators become less effective because of their constant exposure to
conflict; whether the parties feel more pressure to settle when mediators
work within the court structure; whether confidentiality concerns are
greater in one mediation model versus the others; the availability of trained
and effective volunteer mediators; what will ultimately be the costs imposed
on the parties if the courts order them to pay; and how will this affect
average resolution costs. The five-state project participants hope to
stimulate research on these key issues.
Ultimately, however, empirical evidence only improves the chances of
determining which values are served. The debate on the priority among
these values will remain. If the parties are well served by a particular
model, which justice system concerns should block its use? Conversely, if a
model effectively achieves justice system aims, when should the parties'
goals dictate a different approach? Judge Brazil and Professor McCrory
have taken us a substantial distance in making these judgments.
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